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The purpose of this study was to determine how the building of Shenyang Jianzhu 
University’s new campus was accomplished under the leadership of Professor Fuchang 
Zhang, Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party for the university, using his 
Communist Party network. This study was conducted in the city of Shenyang, Liaoning 
Province, Peoples Republic of China, using interviews with Professor Zhang, his peers, 
government officials, and other university presidents. Archival data is also included.  
There were limitations in the study that included personal and professional friendships, 
student recruiting issues, as well as methodological limitations because all interviews had 
to be translated from Mandarin into English and transcribed. The study surrounds the 
controversy of a proposed move of Shenyang Jianzhu University from its old campus to 
its new campus. There were university faculty, government officials, as well as other 
university presidents who resisted such a move based on government regulation, funding, 
and peer pressure for the other presidents to do the same. Professor Zhang assumed 
leadership of the university through a two-tiered system of a president and Communist 
Party Secretary General of the university upon the retirement of President Chen. This 
gave Professor Zhang the opportunity to build the new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu 
University. The study further focuses on Professor Zhang and his powerful role and 
paradoxical style of leadership. On the one hand, he is a strong, tough leader who is 
capable of taking full control of the university leadership formally, through his role as the 
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary (his official role) and informally, through 
the administrative apparatus. On the other hand, he is a team player, is persuasive, and is 
a dynamic, entrepreneurial leader who seems to create a great deal of trust in his Party 
 
  iv 
and Liaoning Province peers. Combining these two sides together, this paradoxical 
leadership led to success in the difficult political environment he faced. His success 
seems to have been the result of the support of his powerful network of peers, who went 
through the difficulties of the Red Guard and Cultural Revolution, and their sacrifices 
together, which has given them a strong bond of trust.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
Overview of the Study 
This is a case study of how Shenyang Jianzhu University in Shenyang, Liaoning 
Province, China (see Figure 1.1) has evolved into one of China’s important universities. 
A key part of this study will be the leadership role of Professor Fuchang Zhang, Secretary 
General of the Communist Party for the university and Communist Party leader of the 
university, in the development of the University and in the building of a new campus. 
The study focuses on the societal context in which Professor Zhang lived and worked, the 
history of Shenyang Jianzhu University, the network of Communist Party officials who 
helped Professor Zhang, and the success of Professor Zhang at Shenyang Jianzhu 
University from 1998 to 2007. 





Background of the Study 
Because of my travels to China on behalf of Urbana University, Urbana, Ohio, I 
became acquainted with the development of Shenyang Jianzhu University and the work 
of the Communist Party leader of the University, Professor Zhang. Due to China’s 
growing global economic strength and the major changes occurring in Chinese higher 
education, I realized that it would be important to study the development of Shenyang 
Jianzhu University, and how it evolved into a contemporary university in today’s China 
because of Professor Zhang’s leadership and his network of fellow educational leaders 
within the Communist Party in Liaoning Province.  
Significance of the Study 
This embedded single-case study will explore the development of Shenyang 
Jianzhu University from its old campus to a new campus, and the role that Professor 
Zhang played in this development. The study will also address how Chinese higher 
education developed in the chaos of pre- and post-Mao China. I expect this study will 
provide some indication that there has been a major paradigm shift in how Chinese 
university leaders manage their institutions, as well as provide some insight into how they 
and their institutions may impact the future of China. This case study is about how 
Shenyang Jianzhu University developed from 1998 to the present, and the importance 
that Communist Party networking played in enabling Professor Zhang to accomplish his 
goals. 
History of Shenyang Jianzhu University 
Shenyang Jianzhu University, established in 1948, is the only comprehensive 





a multi-disciplinary education with an emphasis on engineering science, industry, 
literature, administration, nature science, agronomy, and law (Wang, 2007). It should be 
noted that the city of Shenyang, Liaoning Province, has a population of 7.5 million 
people; Liaoning Province has over 42 million people. 
Although the university was established in 1948, this study is focused on the 
development of the university from 1998 to 2007. It has been during these years, in 
concert with the massive developments in Chinese higher education and the burgeoning 
Chinese economy, that the university, under the leadership of Professor Zhang, developed 
a new campus, merged with other institutions, and became a major Chinese university. 
Professor Zhang’s achievement was not only building new university facilities on a new 
campus, but also the creation of a university culture to achieve this task. The new 
campus, while very contemporary in design, was based on people-oriented concepts and 
ideas of the harmonious coexistence between nature and human beings. The concept of 
harmonious coexistence was so important to Professor Zhang, that the design kept 
sections of the rice patties that originally grew where the university was built (see Figure 
1.2). The planting and harvesting of rice from those fields continues to this day, and each 
year the university packages the rice and gives small sample bags as gifts to donors and 






Figure 1.2. Professor Zhang in field where new campus was built. 
 
Research Question 
The research question for the study was: Within the changing social and cultural 
context of post-Mao Chinese society, how was Professor Fuchang Zhang able to 
significantly increase the size and scope of Shenyang Jianzhu University by building a 
new campus?  
Methodology for the Study 
This study utilizes an embedded single-case study as its mode of inquiry. Data 
collection involves a series of 15 in-depth interviews conducted with Professor Zhang, 
his peers, other university presidents, and Communist Party government officials in 
Liaoning Province. The questions were primarily unstructured in order to allow unique 





beginning structure to the interviewees because of the English and Mandarin language 
issues (McMillan & Schumacher, 2001).  
Because the majority of the individuals interviewed do not speak English, a 
translator was used during the interviews to allow for translation between English and 
Mandarin. All interviews were electronically recorded after receiving proper oral 
permissions from the interviewees. An MBA student from Urbana University, whose 
name is Jieli Li, did the electronic transcribing and translating of all interviews. In 
addition to the electronic recordings, Jieli Li produced a written transcription and 
translation of each interview. 
Professor Zhang has given permission for use of questionnaires previously 
administered through Shenyang Jianzhu University regarding his leadership of the 
University. The questionnaires were written and administered by the Communist Party. 
Because the Party refused to release the specific questions used in the questionnaires, I 
only have the overall results and not the questions themselves. 
Limitations of the Study 
Some key limitations to the study are relationship-based and others are research-
based. I was presented an opportunity to meet Professor Zhang while I was recruiting 
Chinese students for the MBA program at Urbana University, which led to both a 
personal friendship and a professional relationship. Because of this relationship and the 
perception I had that Professor Zhang was quite successful in developing a new campus 
for his university, there is the potential for bias on my part. There is also the possibility 
that Professor Zhang’s colleagues, who were very much a part of his network and helped 





how they discussed his work. I have tried to mitigate some of the potential for this bias by 
interviewing a diverse number of his colleagues.  
Another limitation of the study related to the methodology. Since I do not speak, 
read, or write Mandarin, I needed to use translators throughout all of the interviews and 
in the transcription process. In order to reduce some of the misunderstanding that could 
arise from working in translation, I used a different translator for the interviews and the 
transcription, and I took detailed notes during the interviews. Finally, while my sample 
consists of 12 interviewees that included Professor Zhang and his peers, government 
officials, and other university officials, I chose not to interview faculty members (other 
than the administrators) or students. This decision was based on the focus of the study, 
which is how a new campus was built for Shenyang Jianzhu University, and the role that 
Professor Zhang played. 
Organization of the Study 
This research is an embedded single-case study of the development of Shenyang 
Jianzhu University and the leadership demonstrated by Professor Zhang. Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation focuses on three areas of literature. First, I will briefly review the history of 
Chinese higher education, with a focus on the last two decades. Second, the chapter 
outlines the history of Shenyang Jianzhu University. Third, chapter 2 will briefly discuss 
the role of Professor Fuchang Zhang at the university. 
Chapter 3 presents the methodology used to carry out this case study of Shenyang 
Jianzhu University and Professor Zhang’s role as Secretary General of the Communist 
Party for the university, which is also the Communist Party leader of the university. 





Zhang. The results of these interviews have been analyzed by the NVivo computer 
program for qualitative analysis.  
Chapter 5 discusses the meaning of the interview results presented regarding the 
role and work of Professor Zhang in chapter 4 in the context of the literature presented in 
chapter 2--the developments of Chinese higher education in the last two decades and 
particularly what happened at Shenyang Jianzhu University during this period. The 
discussion will deal with the key role that Professor Zhang’s personal network of 
educational and Chinese Communist Party leaders, which he developed through his 
membership in the Chinese Youth League and the Chinese Communist Party, played in 
Shenyang Jianzhu University’s development into a major Chinese university. In chapter 
5, I also discuss the implications of the development of Shenyang Jianzhu University (see 
Figure 1.3) and Professor Zhang’s style of leadership on the future of Chinese higher 
education. 






Chapter II: Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
This chapter will present a brief history of Chinese higher education with a strong 
focus on the last two decades to help the reader understand the context in which 
Shenyang Jianzhu University developed. The major historical themes of this literature 
review include the influence of the constantly changing purposes of Chinese higher 
education through regime changes; the historical context of the Cultural Revolution, the 
Red Guard, and the Chinese Youth League, and the influence on leaders in Chinese 
higher education; and briefly, the nature of the governance structure of Chinese 
universities which is a dual-structure based on the Communist Party interests and the 
operations of the university. Another section of this review will deal with the history of 
Shenyang Jianzhu University and the major events in the development of the university, 
which is the primary focus of this research, along with the relationship between Professor 
Fuchang Zhang and Shenyang Jianzhu University, and how he led the development of the 
University.  
Chinese higher education is fundamentally influenced by its historical traditions, 
as is almost all contemporary Asian higher education. Altbach and Umakoshi (2004) 
report that no Asian university is truly Asian in origin, as all are based on European 
academic models and traditions imposed by colonial rulers. The fact that Asian 
universities began as foreign models played a central role in how these institutions 
developed with regard to academic freedom, institutional autonomy, and the relationship 






History. Founded in 1895, Tianjin University was the earliest modern university 
and the Imperial University, later Peking (now Beijing) University, founded in 1898, was 
the first university opened to the public in modern times. The founding of these two 
universities was the formal beginning of Chinese modern higher education (Hayhoe, 
1996).    Beginning in 1911, the history of China has been one of radical social, political, 
and economic changes due to the end of the dynasties (Egri & Ralston, 2004). 
Prior to 1911, the values in the development of Chinese higher education were 
very different than those found in the universities of Europe, where the fundamental 
scholarly values can be summed up with the two concepts of autonomy and academic 
freedom. The concept of autonomy in European universities was based on communities 
of scholars who set their own standards of knowledge and set the standards for the 
selection of students, as well as the internal structure and organization of the universities. 
Academic freedom in European universities was the precondition for scholars to search 
out and advance knowledge in their particular fields without political or governmental 
interference (Hayhoe, 1996).  
Lixian and Cortazzi (2006) suggest that there was no real parallel between 
Chinese traditions in education and the ideals of academic freedom found in Europe. In 
effect, the Chinese scholarly institutions were the polar opposite of the academia in 
Europe, as neither autonomy nor academic freedom existed. 
The revolution of 1911 against the emperor by the warlords established the 
Republic of China. The country was essentially ruled by warlords and their armies who 
overthrew the emperor until the Northern Expedition of 1927 established the Nationalist 





in education took place. In 1922 and 1924, an American influence was introduced in 
education by reform-minded intellectuals (Egri & Ralston, 2004). There was a move 
toward social responsibility as seen in American universities, which meant that the 
concept of education for the common person was introduced. It was also during this 16-
year period that the ideals of autonomy and academic freedom began to take root 
(Hayhoe, 1996). 
Chinese Communist philosophy exerted its influence on higher education for the 
first time in the 1920s and 1930s with the creation of Shanghai University (Jin & Jau-wei, 
2004). The university was founded on Marxist theoretical ideology in 1921 
simultaneously with the formation of the Communist Party--providing explicit links 
between the two. The intention of the creation of Shanghai University was to ensure that 
its roots would be aligned with China’s Communist revolutionary transformation. 
However, the University met its demise in 1928 when it was closed down by Nationalist 
government authorities and replaced by the National Labor University whose purpose 
was to replace Shanghai University (Hayhoe, 1996).  
Higher education changed once again with the founding of the People’s Republic 
of China in 1949 (Xin, 1998). Soon after the Chinese Communist Party came into power 
in 1949, there was a restructuring of higher education institutions. The Consolidation Era 
between 1949 and 1956 sought to establish a new Communist order that placed the 
Communist Party above traditional concerns of family and the individual (Yang, R., 
2000).  
Under the reign of Mao Zedong (1949 through 1976), higher education was 





management of higher education. All schools were state run (Mok, 2005). This new 
centralization followed a Soviet–inspired version of higher education characterized by 
comprehensive universities (Wing-Wan, 1995).  
Academic freedom, once again, was not allowed. Instead, the emphasis in higher 
education was the new socialist economy and politics. The new Communist state, 
however, did have respect for the system that was set up under the Nationalist 
government and it entrusted the professors under that system with revising the curriculum 
according to Communist Party ideology. The Communist Party plan was to lay down 
clear guidelines and provide teaching materials that would gradually shape the socialist 
state (Yang, R., 2000).  
The number of Chinese higher educational institutions declined under this 
restructuring while the number of students increased (Xin, 1998). This newly restructured 
national system of higher education emerged as the People’s University System, which 
was administered jointly by the Minister of Higher Education and the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party (Hayhoe, 1996). 
There was continued identification with the Soviet Union educational model due 
to the international political climate associated with the Cold War and China’s 
participation in the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, which resulted in breaking off 
relations with the United States (Rai, 1991).  
The Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution Decade (1966-1976) began 
with factional politics and the struggle between those who supported two different 
agendas: the radical faction of Mao, who was in favor of education for the masses of 





model was in favor of the development of history, economics, politics, culture, and 
international affairs within the Communist Party. As part of the Cultural Revolution, Mao 
was determined to have his philosophy of higher education dominate. Mao’s new 
direction for higher education was to lead to tragedy as anarchy, violence, and chaos 
emerged (Hayhoe, 1996).  
In the 1960s, Mao began to see trends from those who supported the Soviet model 
of higher education that clashed with his ideology and vision of what a revolutionary 
society should be, which, along with many other factors, led to the Cultural Revolution. 
Mao saw, from the Party faction that did not support him, a culture dominated by 
traditional themes rather than revolutionary themes. He saw a Communist Party that had 
transformed itself from a servant of the people into a bureaucratic organization full of 
corruption, biased social programs that neglected the peasants, and ideological softness. 
Mao believed that if the trends that he saw continued, China would return to capitalism 
and all the sacrifices and struggles of the past would have come to nothing (Gao, 1987). 
Mao is reported to have had two additional motivations for launching the Cultural 
Revolution. First, he was concerned about the youth of China. He believed that they 
could become worthy successors to the revolution only if they participated in making the 
revolution. This perception was critical to the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in the 
schools, and the Red Guards became one of Mao’s main allies in his struggle against the 
Party bureaucracy. Second, although the Cultural Revolution was a battle of ideas, it was 
also a power struggle. By 1965, Mao felt the Party leaders slighted him because of the 
failure of his programs. Therefore, Mao saw the Cultural Revolution as a way to restore 





Following the death of Mao, the Cultural Revolution was officially defined as 
wrongly started by Mao, taken advantage of by a handful of plotters, and a disaster to the 
Party’s cause and the Chinese people’s lives (Lin, 1991). As described by Lin (1991), the 
Cultural Revolution mobilized and engaged the masses to fight among each other with 
the consequence that large numbers of people were humiliated to the point of suicide or 
were tortured to death, and countless people were permanently wounded, both physically 
and psychologically. 
The Red Guard. The Cultural Revolution, as discussed in the previous section, 
indicates the movement from Mao’s perspective and his reasons for its beginning. 
Another important perspective on the Cultural Revolution and its consequences on the 
masses of China was the development of the student movement known as the Red Guard. 
The Red Guard Movement began with Mao’s support. On August 18, 1966, Mao publicly 
reviewed one million Red Guards in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square. From then on, the Red 
Guard Movement gained legitimacy, power, and prestige. While the Chinese Communist 
Party has always relied on the youth as part of the Revolution, the Red Guard was the 
first major youth movement after the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution 
(Fairbank, 1989). 
The Red Guards totally trusted the Party and Mao and, therefore, did not feel that 
they could make mistakes. The Red Guards repeatedly quoted Mao’s words to justify 
their acts, “the thousand components of Marxism can be summed up in one sentence: 
Rebellion is justified. Based on this understanding, one should struggle, resist, and make 





Literally, Red Guard means students who were from red categories and who were 
regarded as the guards of Chairman Mao Zedong and the socialist cause. The Red 
categories included the proletarian class, workers, peasants, revolutionary soldiers, and 
revolutionary martyrs. The class enemies were referred to as Black categories: landlords, 
rich peasants, reactionaries, bad elements, rightists, traitors, and spies. Students who were 
considered enemies of the state because of their elite backgrounds were denied admission 
to the Red Guards (Lin, 1991). 
The Red Guard movement after 1967 became involved in the politics of the 
country. It divided into different factions, differing in political opinions and support, each 
faction claiming that it was the most loyal to Chairman Mao. Antagonism among the 
factions reached its climax when they fought among themselves and resulted in hundreds 
of thousands of casualties. The fighting continued among the Red Guards until mid-1968, 
when Mao decided to send the army and workers’ organizations into schools to restore 
order (Yixin, 1999). The end to the Red Guard movement came officially in 1968, when 
Mao sent a group of workers to Qinghua University, the birthplace of the Red Guard 
movement, to suppress the movement and bring it officially to an end due to the extreme 
violence and number of deaths (Yang, G., 2000). After that time, the Red Guards were 
not major actors in the Cultural Revolution. The last eight years of the Cultural 
Revolution (1969 through 1976) saw less large-scale violence (Yixin, 1999).  
Although the Red Guards were devout, even fanatic, followers of Chairman Mao, 
no generation in the People’s Republic suffered more misfortunes than the Red Guard 





between 1947 and 1959 (Yixin, 1999). In effect, the Red Guard, as a major force, lasted 
only about two years--from mid-1966 to 1968 (Yixin, 1999).       
The Communist Youth League. Luo (2004) writes that university students in China 
have always enjoyed a unique status. University students have led many political 
movements, causing political and social changes in China. Before the 1940s, and during 
the 1950s and 1960s, student activism was part of the radicalism that led to the victories 
of the Communist Party. During the late 1960s and 1970s, revolutionary youth played 
roles in the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guard. The reform decade of the 1980s 
witnessed a reemergence of youth, with different ideologies than the radical Red Guard, 
culminating in the Tiananmen Square movement of 1989. Throughout these times, the 
youth of China have always played an important role in the ideology of their country. 
The chronology of the Chinese youth movement dates back over 90 years to 1911, 
or the end of dynasty rule and the introduction of parliamentary rule. The first youth 
movement was based on the Chinese bourgeois revolution, which marked the end of 
dynasty rule between 1911 and 1913. Later, in 1919, there was a second youth movement 
led by the proletariat youth. The founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 gave 
rise to yet another youth movement based on socialism. The Chinese Communist Party 
used the evolution of the youth movements for developing the revolutionary ideals for the 
youth of China. About 1949, the youth movement, which coincides with the Communist 
movement in higher education, was named the Communist Youth League, which is still 
the name of the group today (Wang, 1993). 
The Communist Youth League was one of the most important organizations in the 





Revolution. It was the link between the Communist Party and the youth of China. The 
Youth League recruited potential student leaders who could be expected to graduate to 
Party membership and leadership. Accordingly, the success or failure of the Youth 
League was linked to the stability of the Chinese Revolution itself (Leader, 1974). 
During the era between 1949 and 1952, the Youth League was asked to mobilize 
the youth to carry out the Party’s programs of economic, political, and military training 
(Joshi, 1980). The Chinese Communist Youth Movement between 1956 and 1962 saw 
the rapid expansion of the Youth League with greatly increased demand on its 
membership. The change in the League’s position that this growth entailed, and its 
increased responsibilities amongst the population, were recognized by its change of name 
to the Communist Youth League (Funnell, 1970). 
The downfall of the Chinese Communist Youth League began in 1967 at the 
beginning of the Cultural Revolution when the Revolutionary Rebel Corps seized power 
from the Central Committee. From 1967 until 1971, the Chinese Communist Youth 
League was inoperative. The leaders of the Youth League acquired the status of an 
enemy of Mao (Leader, 1974).     
In 1978, it was decided that, with the demise of Mao who died in 1976, the Youth 
League would emphasize economic development as opposed to the Party emphasis of 
socialism. In order to attain the new goals of economic development, the Chinese 
Communist Youth League’s leadership fell under the control of the Party’s leadership to 
establish the Youth League as a regular working arm of the Party (Joshi, 1980). 
Students began to look at the Youth League differently. The students gradually 





Chinese Communist Party was a way to career successes and individual interests 
(Dingxin, 1997). 
Post cultural revolution. Through the Cultural Revolution, Mao gave a clear 
warning to the intellectuals in higher education that they had gone too far in their 
criticisms. This effectively silenced the voices of the scholars. Just before the beginning 
of the Cultural Revolution, the Ministry of Higher Education was abolished--placing 
institutions under provincial control. This move strengthened Party control over 
educational institutions. The preferred model for most provinces was to establish new 
provincial comprehensive universities. The Cultural Revolution affected a drop in 
enrollment in higher education (Hayhoe, 1996). 
Clearly the expectation was that a new and revolutionary knowledge system could 
be fostered, with the disciplines and specializations of the Western and Soviet 
University suspended for once and for all. . . . The struggle was to lead to tragedy. 
No viable educational alternative emerged, only anarchy, violence, and chaos. 
(Hayhoe, 1996, p. 103) 
 
Following Mao’s death in 1976 and the end of the Gang of Four, Deng Xiaoping, 
the new leader of China and one of the old guard of the Chinese Communist Party, 
ushered in the Social Reform Era in 1978 by encouraging individualism and economic 
efficiency (Egri & Ralston, 2004). The crucial task for higher education under his 
leadership was to restore some structure to higher education after the destructive years of 
Mao’s Cultural Revolution. The first period of this restoration, from 1978 through the 
mid-1980s, saw a great deal of expansion. The second period, 1985 until 1992, was 
devoted to education reform (Xin, 2001). 
The reform period began with a change in goals for educational development 





of modernization. This enabled many people who were not able to attend higher 
education because of the Cultural Revolution to catch up (Hayhoe, 1996). 
Beginning in the 1980s, a pattern of contemporary reforms in Chinese higher 
education occurred within a new international and economic framework that saw the 
decline of communism. Higher education in China adapted three major characteristics: 
decentralization, diversification of curriculum, and removal of political forces from 
campuses including the abolition of political and ideological ideas from the curriculum. 
The state’s guidance was focused on economic ideas and economic development (Wing-
Wan, 1995). 
Political control in the Chinese universities had depended heavily on the 
cooperation of the students. Now, participating in Communist ideology was no longer 
necessary for students. As a result, political control over students began to decline, which 
made a significant contribution to the rise of the 1989 Chinese Student Movement 
(Dingxin, 1997).  
The Chinese students rebelled at Tiananmen Square in 1989 to fight against 
corruption, bureaucracy, and political control. They demanded a democratic system with 
greater participation in the rule of law, freedom of the press, and political reform. The 
movement and the students were suppressed by the Communist Party (Dingxin, 1997). 
The 1989 movement was a setback for both Chinese youth and the Communist 
Party. It was a setback for the youth because the government’s reaction to their 
movement was the opposite of their hopes and expectations; it was a setback for the 
Chinese Communist Party because it showed that the official communist ideology had 





maintained tighter control and the youth have avoided involvement in politics. In 
addition, following the 1989 movement, students were generally not interested in 
applying for membership to or attending activities of the Communist Youth League 
(Dingxin, 1997). 
Further, as a result of the 1989 Tiananmen Square tragedy, many changes took 
place in the internal management of university curricula. After the Tiananmen Square 
event of 1989, many of the diverse interactions with international universities that had 
become vital to the process of higher education in China came under threat. The 
government suspended many foreign programs which it felt would foster unwelcome 
influences from Western countries. In 1993, however, the Party implemented the reform 
document that gave much of this freedom back to the universities. For the first time, there 
seemed to be a possibility that political study could enter into a relationship of dialogue 
and mutual transformation with other fields of knowledge (Hayhoe, 1996). 
Present. Chinese universities, although shaped by their historical traditions, have 
had to face the complex realities of the 21st century. The population of China has a low 
level of education and a low-quality, or uneducated, workforce, with university students 
occupying a special position in the labor market (Fang, 2005). The economic miracle 
taking place in China has not been based on higher education. The typical pattern of 
industrialization was based on an inexpensive labor force (Fang, 2005).  
However, much like other developing nations, China’s continued dependence on 
an uneducated workforce will not allow its economy to continue to flourish. Moreover, 
China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) has led to cross-cultural 





communication issues are adding to an irreversible internationalizing trend in Chinese 
higher education reform. The challenges are considerable to bring higher education to the 
masses: the two most important are funding the expansion and providing physical 
facilities (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004). This is the basis of this case study about the 
major events in the development of Shenyang Jianzhu University.  
Restructuring higher education has required the Chinese government to eliminate 
excessive government controls by granting universities more autonomy over curriculum 
and resources. The government believes that by extending greater autonomy, the 
universities will become more innovative and responsive to the 21st century needs of 
higher education (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004). However, along with reform and greater 
autonomy, arises new accountability. The leaders in higher education usually have an 
annual performance appraisal, which the government uses to decide funding and status of 
the university leaders (Vidovich, Yang, & Currie, 2007). Professor Zhang’s leadership 
qualities are measured annually in a sample questionnaire that is presented as archival 
data for this study.  
Although the state has increased appropriations for higher education, there are 
still serious financial constraints on the universities. One of the changes permitted 
through increased autonomy is to allow Chinese universities to use their professors and 
staff specializing in science and technology to generate revenue for the university by 
forming companies affiliated with the university (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004). 
Policies about curriculum and instruction in higher education have evolved during 
the last two decades, as China has made the transition from a planned economy to a 





have been encouraged which has led to a shift away from the old learning processes of 
memorization to new emphases on critical thinking (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004).  
While the establishment of the market economy requires that education adapt to 
the economic changes, at the same time Chinese leaders still maintain that a socialist 
market economy should follow Marx’s thesis that social existence is determined by 
society’s conditions of production. This is viewed by some as incompatible with a 
successful market economy (Guorui, 2006). 
The market economy has increasingly become a fact that cannot be ignored in 
China’s economic life. People have opened their minds to these facts and for the 
first time since the founding of the People’s Republic have listed education and 
the socialist market economy as important. (Guorui, 2006, p. 36) 
 
The goal of Chinese higher education in the 21st century is to achieve world-class 
status and be part of the international academic community. In order to accomplish this, 
faculty reform is paramount. Traditionally, since China did not have a postgraduate 
degree system until the 1980s, only 30% of the faculty holds postgraduate degrees. 
Therefore, more faculty members are being sent abroad to study and are becoming 
internationally trained scholars (Altbach & Umakoshi, 2004). Previously there were few 
measures in place to encourage faculty to continue their education due to the ideological 
and political concern about faculty. This lack of encouragement slowed the development 
of faculty in higher education. The Party has now set strategic targets for faculty which 
include higher ethical standards, quality checks, salary increases, more promotions, 
increased funding, and more sabbaticals (Wei, 2005). 
Chinese universities have undergone rapid expansion. Enrollment increased from 





and access to higher education in China for lower income families (Altbach & Umakoshi, 
2004). 
The History of Shenyang Jianzhu University    
Shenyang Jianzhu University was established in 1948. It is the only 
comprehensive university in Liaoning Province that specializes in civil engineering and 
architecture; however, it has academic programs in engineering, science, literature, 
administration, agriculture, and law. There is a long-standing history of transformation 
that is a result of institutions that have joined together to become Shenyang Jianzhu 
University (Mei, 1997). 
Mei (1997) provides background on Shenyang Jianzhu University and identifies 
its roots in Liaoning Construction Industry College from 1948. Following the Industry 
College was the founding of Shenyang Technical Specialist College, which was changed 
into Shenyang Industrial Technical College in 1952 to meet the educational and 
economic needs of the area. A subsequent evolution in 1953 saw another name change to 
Shenyang Industrial College which operated in conjunction with the North Military 
Industrial College. This structure lasted until 1958. The evolution of the university 
continued with a subsequent name change to Liaoning Construction Engineering College 
in 1964, and once again experienced another name change to Province Scale College in 
1974 (Mei, 1997). 
Deng Xiaoping, who became the nation’s leader on January 1, 1975, was a 
proponent of education innovation, believing that science, physics, and foreign language 
knowledge was necessary (Mei & Zhang, 1987). In order to align with the new 





established in 1976. Liaoning Construction Engineering College was reorganized with an 
emphasis on innovation with ten new majors in foreign language, education, and the 
sciences as well as the study of Marxism and Leninism (Mei & Zhang, 1987). 
Graduate programs were started during this period. In addition, there was a focus 
on educational reforms in the sciences and student political work. These developments 
coincided with the formation of the First College Party Union and First Instructor 
Representative group, which was formed to meet with instructors to help begin graduate 
programs (Mei, 1997). 
In order to stabilize college leadership and strengthen the new educational 
guidelines, the Second College Party Union, along with the Second Instructor 
Representative’s meeting, was held. These two groups established new guidelines 
designed to strengthen programs in the sciences, languages, and politics, as well as 
education and research curricula (Mei, 1997). 
The Third and Fourth College Party Union, and Instructor Representatives groups 
met and began plans for the next century to further Deng Xiaoping’s goals for education. 
As part of the new goals, planning began for major construction of a new campus that 
would use concepts and ideas of harmonious coexistence between nature and human 
beings (Mei, 1997).  
In the year 2000, which marked the next five-year plan, Liaoning Construction 
Engineering College became a university and the name was changed again to Shenyang 
Architectural and Civil Engineering Institute. In 2003, with the first entering class for the 
new campus, the name was changed to Shenyang Jianzhu University. As a result of the 





200 other universities and colleges, were transferred from the Central Ministries and 
Committees to the authority of the provincial government in Liaoning Province, thereby 
stressing local management while developing cooperation between the central 
government and the local government (Wang, 2007).  
The new policies of the provincial government allowed Shenyang Jianzhu 
University to build the new campus in the Hunan section of the city of Shenyang. One of 
the new policies permitted the University to raise, by itself, 800 million Chinese Yuan 
(64 million US Dollars) by selling the land where the old campus was located to allow 
the financing of the land for the new campus (Wang, 2007).  
The building of Shenyang Jianzhu University’s new campus occurred in less than 
two years. The size of the university grew from 133,400 square meters to the current 
980,490 square meters. The student population increased from 4,000 to almost 13,000 
undergraduate and graduate students (Wang, 2007). 
Professor Zhang assumed the leadership of Shenyang Jianzhu University in 1998. 
The building of the new campus was the result of his leadership in financing and 
government action. 
Today, the new campus is located in the college town of the Hunan New District 
in Shenyang, a city of 7.5 million people in Northeastern China (Liaoning Province), 
North of North Korea, and has a total campus area of about one million square meters 
and a total building area of over one-half million square meters. An external, three-level 
corridor, which is about one-half mile long connects the teaching, lab, living, and 
administrative areas together. The architectural design of this corridor is unique to the 





Shenyang Jianzhu University has 15 colleges and 1,560 faculty members. Current 
enrollment consists of nearly 16,000 degree candidates, including 11,634 undergraduates, 
780 graduates, as well as doctoral students, foreign students, and students enrolled in 
adult and professional schools. The University has master’s degrees in 18 programs and 
one doctoral degree. Undergraduate education consists of 33 subjects (Wang, 2007).  
Shenyang Jianzhu University has sister relationships with more than 40 
universities in 30 countries. In this way, Shenyang Jianzhu University has strengthened 
its connection with foreign universities worldwide (Wang, 2007).  
Figure 2.1. Construction in 2002 with external corridor. 
 
Professor Fuchang Zhan 
Professor Fuchang Zhang was a part of the Cultural Revolution, a member of the 
Red Guard, a member of the Communist Youth League, and a member of the ruling 





living through this turbulent history. Professor Zhang is a Secretary General of the 
Communist Party Committee (the Chinese Communist Party Leader) of Shenyang 
Jianzhu University in Liaoning Province. 
The distinguishing characteristic of Chinese Communist leadership is that the 
leadership is composed of the Party elite (Burns, 1979). Because the Communist Party 
elite are the leaders in China, one could argue that the great man theory of leadership 
from the 1930s, or the trait and behavior leadership theorists through the 1950s and 1960s 
would apply to the Communist elite because of their authoritarian revolutionary style of 
leadership (Rost, 1993). While professor Zhang is a member of the Party elite and could 
be seen as part of this leader-focused conception, he does display a strong interest in a 
much more networked leadership style through his elaborate network of peers, 
government leaders, and other university leaders. Yukl (2002) writes that networks are 
identified in a number of ways. But, the important factors are showing respect, offering 
unconditional favors, passing on useful information, and showing appreciation for favors 
received. Old relationships need to be maintained while developing new ones. Bass 
(1990) writes that the typical network is composed of subordinates, peers, superiors, and 
outsiders, which reflects the composition of Professor Zhang’s networks. Networks are 
important because quite often, especially in the complex realities of 21st century 
organizations, the performance and effectiveness of the leader and domain of influence 
depends on the size and scope of the network (Bass, 1990). Professor Zhang is very much 
involved with such a network, which is consistent with what Bass (1990) refers to as 





Chinese university governance. As a result of the Communist Party’s 
politicization of the higher education system in 1985, the State Education Commission 
directed that the state would control the appointments of chief university executives, the 
development of the curriculum, and the nature of student activities. Therefore, there was 
an integration of university administration and politics. Within the Chinese higher 
education system, there are two governance structures: the university administration team 
led by a president and a Communist Party Secretary General of the University, who, at 
Shenyang Jianzhu University, is Professor Zhang (Wing-Wan, 1995). 
Under this system, university presidents were given limited powers over the 
institution, which were mostly administrative powers. The Party Secretary General was 
given the duties to guarantee and supervise the implementation of the Party’s principles, 
policies and the state’s educational plans. The 1993 education reform guidelines 
explicitly direct that the Party leader has the highest decision-making role in each higher 
education institution (Wing-Wan, 1995). 
University financing. Because this case study is focused on how Shenyang 
Jianzhu University evolved from 1998 to the present, financing of the new campus and 
the role that Professor Zhang played in the financing is of importance. After 1949, when 
the Communist Party assumed control of China, private financing in Chinese higher 
education was perceived to be associated with capitalism. All private colleges, especially 
those run by churches, were nationalized in the 1950s--ownership was transferred to the 
state. The Chinese Communist Party saw this nationalization as a way to prevent foreign 
influences on Chinese higher education. As a result, Chinese higher education was 





A new era of financing Chinese higher education emerged during the 1970s that 
changed the policies of the 1940s through the 1950s. Financing of higher education in 
China was influenced by three distinct periods starting in the 1970s.  
The first period from 1978 to the beginning of the 1980s, is the period of restoring 
the higher education system. The second period from 1985 until 1992 reflects the 
first wave of higher education reform. The third period from 1992 to [2001], 
reflects government efforts to deepen the reform of the structuring and financing 
of higher education. (Xin, 2001, p. 206) 
 
Xin (2001) continues 
China’s higher education administrative and finance reform has attempted to 
decentralize the financial responsibility to lower levels of government and 
restructure the administrative system. The finance reforms have diversified the 
funding scheme of higher education and created more channels for public 
financing of higher education. (p. 216) 
 
As will become evident, Professor Zhang’s ability to raise large amounts of 
money from many sources represents a key part of his success. His ability to develop 
these financial resources is no doubt related to his personal skills but is also the result of 
his network of associates that was developed as a result of his experiences in the Cultural 
Revolution, the Red Guard, the Communist Youth League, and the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
In China, the political leaders are identified by numbering generations. The 
Fourth Generation is the group of leaders in their 50s and early 60s. The Fourth 
Generation leaders, who are Professor Zhang’s peer group, follow two models of 
nationalism. The official Party ideology is still that of the historical patriotic struggle 
linked to the Chinese Communist Party. The Party is the center of nationalism. The 
second model is called popular nationalism, can be more critical of the Party, and is 





While Fourth Generation leaders are somewhat constrained due to popular nationalism, 
they are also free to make choices that could not be made in the past (Seckington, 2005). 
Conclusion 
This case study will contribute to the body of knowledge of Chinese higher 
education by studying the building of a Chinese university (see Figure 2.2 for the first 
entering class of the university), and then exploring the role of its leader in the building 
process. It is hoped that the integration of these elements will provide for a better 
understanding of Chinese higher education institutions, especially Shenyang Jianzhu 
University. 
There are many questions that can be asked about Professor Zhang that address 
his role in Chinese higher education reform and the development of Shenyang Jianzhu 
University. Given that Professor Zhang is credited with building the new campus, what 
was his exact role at the University at the time? How did he get the power to make all 
these changes? What was his relationship to other stakeholders at the University? How do 
those stakeholders perceive Professor Zhang’s roles and success? How did he get the 
resources to achieve these changes? Who comprised his networks? How was Professor 
Zhang perceived by key educational leaders in Liaoning Province? How did his 
membership in the Communist Youth League and the Communist Party help him to 











Chapter III: Methodology 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to describe the development of Shenyang Jianzhu 
University, which was established in 1948 in Liaoning Province as the only 
comprehensive university that specializes in civil engineering and architecture, as well as 
multidisciplinary education among engineering science, industry, literature, 
administration, nature science, agronomy, and law. The study focuses on the role played 
by the Chinese Communist Party Leader of the University, and Secretary General of the 
Communist Party, Professor Fuchang Zhang, in significantly expanding the physical and 
enrollment capacity of Shenyang Jianzhu University.  
Methodology 
The methodology for this study will be a single-case study to explore the 
development of Shenyang Jianzhu University. Yin (2003) writes of four types of case 
study designs. There are holistic and embedded single-case designs, as well as holistic 
and embedded multiple-case designs. The holistic design concerns a case study that 
examines the global nature of an organization or program. In contrast is the embedded 
case study, which is the methodology I have chosen. The embedded case study design is 
the study of a single case, the construction of a new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu 
University, but attention is also given to a subunit of study, which is the role Professor 
Fuchang Zhang, Communist Party leader of the university, played in the development of 
the university. Embedded studies sometimes also use some quantitative analysis, which, 
to a limited extent, will be the case in this study. Professor Zhang has authorized my use 





years that studied his performance as the leader of Shenyang Jianzhu University and 
Secretary General of the Communist Party at the University as his position relates to his 
leadership of Shenyang Jianzhu University (J. Yu, personal communication, April 6, 
2007). 
 “One of the strengths of qualitative methods is the inductive, naturalistic inquiry 
strategy of approaching a setting without a predetermined hypothesis” (Patton, 2002, p. 
129). Qualitative research was selected as the research method for this study because it is 
the best method to inquire not just about the history of Shenyang Jianzhu University, but 
also how the institution developed from its inception under the Chinese Communist Party 
rules into a well-known, modern educational institution in today’s environment. 
Quantitative data would not begin to bring to life the true story.  
A major part of this study is how Professor Zhang was instrumental in the 
development of Shenyang Jianzhu University and the evolution of his personal life from 
being a part of the Cultural Revolution, a member of the Chinese Communist Youth 
League and the Red Guard, to becoming a Secretary General of the Communist Party of 
the University. A qualitative study such as this is the best approach to explore Professor 
Zhang’s role in the building of a new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu University.  
Rationale 
There are five primary reasons that a single-case study is an appropriate design. 
The first rationale is the critical case, which tests a well-formulated theory. The second 
rationale is a unique case, mostly used in clinical psychology. The third rationale is the 
representative case, in which the case study may represent a project that is informative to 





phenomenon previously inaccessible. The fifth rationale for a single-case study is a 
longitudinal case study, or the same single case at two or more points in time (Yin, 
2003). 
The rationale for my single case study is the fourth rationale or the revelatory 
case, whose objective is to observe a phenomenon previously inaccessible such as this 
study that explores the construction of Shenyang Jianzhu University and the role of 
Professor Zhang in this undertaking. The lessons learned in revelatory studies are 
distinguished as rare or unique, which is apparent in this study because Professor Zhang, 
as a Secretary General of the Communist Party at Shenyang Jianzhu University has never 
given access to his story for an empirical study (Yin, 2003). The Letter of Approval that 
is part of my approved IRB application for this research goes directly to the revelatory 
rationale in that my research is seen as informative to Shenyang Jianzhu University. The 
letter of approval states “We firmly believe that his [William D. Blizzard, Jr.’s] research 
will contribute to the sustainable development of the University and we will try our best 
to cooperate with Professor William in his further study” (J. Yu, personal 
communication, April 6, 2007). Further evidence that the rationale for this case study is 
revelatory or unique is that when I first proposed this research to Professor Zhang and he 
agreed, he also told me that he had been asked by other researchers, as well as the 
Chinese press, if they could write about his successes and leadership methods but he had 
declined.  
Data Sources 
Data collection involved a series of in-depth interviews conducted with Professor 





and Indianapolis, Indiana respectively, while professor Zhang was visiting in the United 
States. Subsequent interviews have taken place in China during visits for the purpose of 
completing the research. The initial interview with Professor Zhang was in 2004, and it 
was that interview that convinced me that this case study would be possible. The 2004 
interview established a relationship of trust between Professor Zhang and me that allowed 
Professor Zhang to give his permission to proceed with the case study about him and 
Shenyang Jianzhu University.  
A second group of interviews was conducted with Professor Zhang’s colleagues 
at the university in 2007. I was given the opportunity to choose anyone that I would like 
to interview and Professor Zhang made the proper arrangements. Additionally, interviews 
with the stakeholders who have interacted with Professor Zhang within the Communist 
Party, with Liaoning Provincial government, and other university officials who know 
Professor Zhang were arranged for my research by the University or by Professor Zhang 
(see Figures 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 for charts of interviews that were conducted). The purpose 
of these interviews was to determine how Shenyang Jianzhu University’s new campus 
was built and the nature of Professor Zhang’s role in this development. The interviews 
from Professor Zhang, his peers, other university officials, and Communist Party 
government officials along with the archival data will be part of the triangulation of the 
study’s conclusions. 
Interviews. Patton (2002) writes “the purpose of interviewing. . . is to allow us to 
enter into the other person’s perspective. We interview to find out what is in and on 
someone else’s mind, and to gather stories” (p. 341). I used the informal conversational 





in whatever direction became appropriate. Data gathered was not only different from 
each person interviewed, but from the same person on different occasions. This does not 
mean that the conversational interviews were unfocused; they required an overall 
purpose, which was kept in mind (Patton, 2002). That focus was the development of 
Shenyang Jianzhu University’s new campus and Professor Zhang’s leadership in this 
endeavor.  
Although I intended to use unstructured interviews, the interviews were 
conducted somewhat formally in the beginning to establish my credentials as a professor 
from Urbana University and a student conducting research for my Ph.D. from Antioch 
University. Also, I demonstrated that I had permission from my university as well as 
from Shenyang Jianzhu University by giving each candidate a copy of my letter of 
approval and establishing orally that I had Professor Zhang’s, as well as the Communist 
Party’s, permission to both record and conduct the interview.  
The major questions related first to establishing the relationship between the 
interviewee and Professor Zhang. Next, I asked questions along the theme of the 
development of Shenyang Jianzhu University and how the development relates to other 
university campuses in Liaoning Province, China. The next general theme of questions 
relates Professor Zhang’s leadership to the development of Shenyang Jianzhu University.  
After establishing the main theme of the development of the University and Professor 
Zhang’s leadership abilities, I asked questions about Professor Zhang’s involvement in 
the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Youth League and the Red Guard, 
which was reportedly an important part of the experience of the current leaders in higher 





interviews. The interviews lasted a minimum of two or more hours and some lasted at 
least four hours.  
The translator for the interviews was Wang Xing (Kevin) who is in the 
Department of International Exchange and Cooperation, Shenyang Jianzhu University. 
He was assigned by the university to accompany me throughout my multiple visits to 
China while conducting my research. Kevin had been briefed on the nature of my 
research, the methodology, and interview techniques involved, as well as the 
confidentiality required for research. I had not given Kevin any questions in advance 
because the design of the study employs open-ended questions. All interviews were 
recorded with a digital recorder capable of downloading the recorded sessions to a 
computer hard drive for translation and transcription. Translation took place 
simultaneously during the interviews as my questions were translated from English into 
Mandarin and the Mandarin answers were translated back into English. The recording 





Figure 3.1. Organizational chart of interviewees. 
 
Figure 3.2. Position chart of interviewees, Liaoning Province Officials. 
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Figure 3.3. Position chart of interviewees, University Administrators. 
 
Archival data. Professor Zhang gave permission for the review and inclusion of 
previously administered Shenyang Jianzhu University questionnaires. These 
questionnaires relate directly to Professor Zhang’s leadership of the university and will be 
provided as archival evidence for the case study. The surveys are sets of questionnaires 
from 2002 through 2005 of Professor Zhang’s performance as a leader (J. Yu, personal 
communication, April 6, 2007). Shenyang Jianzhu University provided only the results of 
the survey. I specifically requested the questions. The university passed my request on to 
the Communist Party, but the Party refused to share them. These data have been provided 
by Shenyang Jianzhu University from their archives (J. Yu, personal communication, 
April 6, 2007). Admittedly the data is sparse and consists of only one question with a 
Likert scale response from 1 to 4 respectively. Therefore, the results of this single 
question will only be used as a descriptive item of interest regarding Zhang’s leadership. 
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 There are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample size depends on 
what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will be 
useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and 
resources. (Patton, 2002, p. 244)       
 
The sampling strategy that I used is opportunistic or emergent sampling, which 
involves decision making to take advantage of new opportunities during actual data 
collection (Patton, 2002). It has been my experience while working in China that one will 
have opportunities presented without planning or notice. I have been in many meetings 
when people, mostly of high ranking authority unexpectedly were in attendance without 
prior indication that they would be there. They can, and often do, change the demeanor of 
a meeting.  
Although I took advantage of opportunistic or emergent sampling, as one person 
or organization referred me to another, or as I encountered someone who has special 
knowledge about Professor Zhang’s work, I did have a list of specific people that I 
wanted to interview. In all, including Professor Zhang, I interviewed 12 people. 
Foremost, of course, was Professor Zhang. Although I previously had the opportunity for 
two interviews with him--one in May, 2004 at Urbana, Ohio and the second in January, 
2007 at Indianapolis, Indiana--I was able to conduct two additional interviews in June 
and July of 2007 in Shenyang. I was able to interview Professor Yu Jin, Director of the 
Department of International Exchange and Cooperation, Shenyang Jianzhu University, 
which was important because he is closely aligned with professor Zhang and is the 
Communist Party representative in charge of my research from the perspective of 
Shenyang Jianzhu University. Another important interview was with Shi Tie Mao, 





of the university administration. I was able to interview Professor Gu Nanning who is the 
Director of the Human Resources Department, Shenyang Jianzhu University. The most 
important interview, other than Professor Zhang, was with Professor Chen, who was the 
past President of Shenyang Jianzhu University and was president when the decision was 
made to move to a new campus.  
I asked Professor Zhang to arrange interviews with other university administrators 
prior to completing interviews with his colleagues because I wanted other university 
administrators to be part of the sample. He arranged for me to interview Wang Qiang, 
President of Shenyang Polytechnic College who has worked for many years with 
Professor Zhang. I was also able to interview Sun Ying, who is the Dean of Shenyang 
Polytechnic College. Another university president that I interviewed was Ding Liyi, 
President of Liaoning Technical Institute of Economic Vocation. 
There were several government officials that I interviewed about professor Zhang 
and Shenyang Jianzhu University. One of the more critical interviews was with Gong 
Xia, Secretary of the Education and Science Working Committee; he is the Party 
representative in charge of all Liaoning Provence University Party leaders and is 
Professor Zhang’s boss. The rapport established in this interview was evidenced by 
Secretary Gong’s invitation for me to have dinner with Professor Zhang, Secretary Gong, 
and their wives that evening. I was told he had not extended himself this way in over 20 
years in his position. I was also able to interview Mr. Gong’s second in charge, Zhao 
Rigang, Deputy Secretary of the Education and Science Working Committee. 
Mrs. Luo Shaomei, Director of the Educational Department of Liaoning Province, 





Shenyang Jianzhu University. I was very pleased to have Mrs. Luo agree to an interview 
not only because of her personal friendship and business relationship with Professor 
Zhang and Shenyang Jianzhu University, but also because she is the person who is in 
charge of the Educational Department of Liaoning Province. Mrs. Luo is the person who 
approved and licensed Urbana University to recruit in China. Pinli Zhang from 
Development Planning of the Education Department of Liaoning Province, was the last 
government official interviewed. He knew Professor Zhang from a planning and approval 
process for Shenyang Jianzhu University’s growth.  
 Data Analysis 
 Raw field notes and verbatim transcripts constitute the undigested complexity of 
reality. Simplifying and making sense out of the complexity constitutes the 
challenge of content analysis. Developing some manageable classification or 
coding scheme is the first step of analysis, [which] . . .essentially means analyzing 
the core content of interviews and observations to determine what’s significant. 
(Patton, 2002, p. 463) 
 
One begins with shorthand codes written directly in the margins directly on the 
relevant data passages. Many passages will illustrate more than one theme or pattern and 
the first reading through the data is to develop coding of the categories or classifications 
(Patton, 2002).  
For case studies, notes are likely to be the most common component of a 
database. The notes may be a result of interviews or observations and may take several 
forms, such as a diary, as long as the system is usable by an outside party (Yin, 2003). I 
took field notes and recorded my interviews. Each interview was translated and 
transcribed electronically, as well as in writing. After an initial coding in the margins of 
the transcription, I entered the data electronically and used the computer program NVivo 





Strauss and Corbin (1998) write that meanings get lost in translation and that 
coding may become difficult in that sometimes there is no equivalent word capable of 
capturing the subtle nuances in the meaning of the original language. Therefore, they 
recommend that key passages should be paid attention to approximating the original as 
closely as possible. I used an MBA student from Urbana University, whose name is Jieli 
Li, to transcribe and translate the interviews from my recording. Jieli Li is very mature 
and is well respected within the university; she has been a graduate assistant to the MBA 
program and has proven herself to be an excellent student and someone who can be 
trusted. She has her bachelor’s degree from Shenyang Communication University and has 
an extensive business background in management in China. Jieli Li was a member of the 
Youth League at her university, which is the group from which future leaders are chosen 
in China. I instructed her to transcribe and ensure translation as accurately as possible 
because of the difficulty in conducting research in a language that I do not speak or 
understand.  
While translating and transcribing interviews is always more difficult and 
complex than working in a language that one speaks and reads, there is an opportunity for 
triangulation when multiple perspectives are used--for example, my having the 
perspective and simultaneous translation of Kevin Wang (during the interviews) and 
especially the translator Jieli Li during the transcription, as well and my own perspective 
and reflections during the interviews and making notes as I did. I used the services of 
Jieli Li to assist with the coding of this case study.  
Patton (1987) writes that 
Denzin (1978) identified four basic types of triangulation: (1) data triangulation--





different status positions or with different points of view; (2) investigator 
triangulation--the use of several different evaluators or social scientists; (3) theory 
triangulation--the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data; and 
(4) methodological triangulation--the use of multiple methods to study a single 
problem or program, such as interviews, observations, questionnaires, and 
documents. (p. 60)  
 
This study used data triangulation through interviewing Professor Zhang, the 
subject of the case study, his colleagues, government officials, and other university 
presidents. This study also used methodological triangulation by using interviews, 
archival documents, and questionnaires. The importance of using multiple sources of 
evidence is the development of converging lines of inquiry (Yin, 2003). In order to 
compare Professor Zhang’s leadership and the development of Shenyang Jianzhu 
University with what occurred at other universities in Liaoning Province, I interviewed a 
number of the successful university and education leaders in Liaoning Province, most of 
whom were part of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Youth League and 
the Red Guard, and who are all familiar with Shenyang Jianzhu University and the work 
of Professor Zhang (see Figure 3.4 for a photo of the university as it currently appears).  
Peer review or debriefing provides an additional external check of the research 
process by asking questions about methods and interpretations of data (Creswell, 1998). 
To accomplish investigator triangulation, I asked one of my peers in the Ph.D. Program 
in Leadership and Change, Dr. Peggy Marshall, who was familiar with analysis and 











Chapter IV: Results 
Introduction 
The purpose of this study was to document how Shenyang Jianzhu University in 
Shenyang, Liaoning Province, Peoples Republic of China significantly increased its size 
and, as a result, has evolved into one of China’s important universities. The central focus 
of this study was the leadership role of Professor Fuchang Zhang, Secretary General of 
the Communist Party for the university and Communist Party leader of the university, in 
the development of the university and in the building of a new campus. The research 
question for the study was: Within the changing social and cultural context of post-Mao 
Chinese society, how was Professor Fuchang Zhang able to significantly increase the size 
and scope of Shenyang Jianzhu University by building a new campus?  
The study utilized an embedded single-case study as its mode of inquiry. Data 
collection involved a series of in-depth interviews conducted with Professor Zhang, his 
peers, other university presidents and deans, and Chinese Communist Party government 
officials in Liaoning Province. The questions were unstructured to allow emergent 
responses.  
Because the majority of the individuals interviewed spoke little English, a 
translator was used during the interviews to allow for translation between English and 
Mandarin. All interviews were electronically recorded after receiving proper oral 
permission from the interviewee. A Chinese MBA student from Urbana University did 
the electronic transcribing and translating of all interviews. In addition to the electronic 





This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section is a description of the 
sample that consists of 15 individual interviews of 12 interviewees. These interviewees 
are further classified as the leaders of Shenyang Jianzhu University, provincial 
government officials, and administrators of other universities. The second section 
discusses the three dimensions that emerged from data analysis of the interviews--
construction, networking, and Professor Zhang--and the key themes within each 
dimension. The dimension including Professor Zhang also includes the archival data 
provided by Professor Zhang in the form of a summary of the results of surveys on his 
leadership abilities. The quantitative surveys include the years from 2002 to 2005.  
The Sample 
The sample consists of 15 unstructured interviews of 12 interviewees with the 
three groups previously identified as Shenyang Jianzhu University, government officials, 
and university administrators. The dates on which each interview was conducted are also 
presented. The numbers attached to column one will be used as a reference for 
transcripts. The letters after each number refer to the group that the interview belongs as 






Interviewee Organization      Title      Dates 
 
1 SJU   Shenyang Jianzhu University  Past President    July 2, 2007 
 






3 UA   Shenyang Polytechnic College Dean      July 1, 2007 
 
4 UA   Education Department   Director     July 1, 2007 
 
    Liaoning Province 
 
5 SJU   Department of International  Director     July 2, 2007 
 
    Change and Cooperation, 
 
    Shenyang Jianzhu University 
 
6 SJU   Human Resources Dept.   Director     June 29, 2007 
 
    Shenyang Jianzhu University 
 
7 A   Shenyang Jianzhu University  Secretary General of  May 6, 2004 
 
             the Communist Party 
 




    B                   Jan. 3, 2007 
 
    C                   June 29, 2007 
 
    D                   July 6, 2007 
 
8 SJU   Shenyang Jianzhu University  Assistant President  July 3, 2007 
 
9 UA   Shenyang Polytechnic College President     July 3, 2007 
 
10 GO   The Education and Science   Secretary     July 3, 2007 
 
     Working Committee of the  
 




11 GO    The Education and Science Deputy Secretary   July 3, 2007 
 










12 UA    Liaoning Technical Institute  Vice President   July 4, 2007  
 
     of Economic Management 
 
 
Overview of Dimensions and Themes     
The analysis of the data from the interviews led to the development of three major 
dimensions, which are university construction, networking, and Professor Zhang. Further 
analysis lead to themes consistent with the overall dimensions. 
 
Table 4.2. 
Overview of the Dimensions and Themes 
 




            The Role of Government 
 




            Communist Party 
 
Professor Zhang   
 
            Leadership 
 







Dimension: University Construction 
The central dimension that emerged for the interview data was the construction of 
a new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu University, which took place beginning in 2001 and 
was essentially completed in 2003. Overall, this dimension describes the critical 
placement in history of the construction of Shenyang Jianzhu University. Although the 
higher education authorities in China were requiring that the majority of the universities 
build new campuses (or major campus physical additions), Shenyang Jianzhu University 
was one of the first universities to do so. Not only was it one of the first universities to 
build a new modern campus, but the way this project was financed and the leadership to 
achieve this task was innovative given the culture of the Chinese Communist Party, 
which controls such projects. Government officials had to give approval for the project 
through their hierarchy, as well as permission for the construction. Approval for the 
funding was also innovative because permission was given to sell the land where the old 
campus was located thereby providing financing for the new campus. In addition, loans, 
which were difficult to attain, were used in the financing. The two primary themes that 
provide greater detail of the importance of this dimension are described along with 
quotations from the transcript that support the interpreted meaning. 
The role of government. During the last three decades, there has been a major 
emphasis in China on building larger universities to serve the growing aspirations of the 
Chinese people for higher education and to meet the needs of Chinese society in general. 
Accomplishing this new and strong emphasis on building universities required major 
adjustments in polices and a new type of Chinese university leader. This was not an easy 





the regionalization of Chinese university governance (from central government control to 
provincial control). In the case of Shenyang Jianzhu University, the change from central 
government to Liaoning Provincial government control occurred at about the time the 
decisions were made to build a new campus, so that the University had to get approval 
from the Central Ministry of Development and then also attain approval by the 
development unit of the province. There was also the issue that there were many 
universities that needed to grow: as reported by one of the interviewees from the city of 
Shenyang: 
I think from the perspective of the Shenyang government, they really wanted 
every university in Shenyang to develop in the future. . . . Every university leader 
really wanted to move because that is a very important chance for the university 
to survive. (Interviewee UA)   
 
Within this context, Professor Zhang’s ambitious plans were not easy to accept by his 
university peers: 
People who report to the government [had trouble letting] Professor Zhang go, 
they reported that they felt nervous with such a plan. (Interviewee UA) 
 
And further as reported by other university presidents: 
Most of the universities in Shenyang, if they do not move like that, they will have 
no space and chance to develop. (Interviewee UA) 
 
Not surprisingly, given limited resources and a mandate to increase university 
presence, there were many universities who tried to follow a plan like the one devised by 
Professor Zhang and Shenyang Jianzhu University, but were not successful: 
To be honest, there are many universities who failed in new campus construction. 
Actually, many factors influenced the decision-making. There are three factors: 
first is the trend in the country--at that time. The government supported the 
development of polytechnic colleges, which offered those institutions the 
opportunity for future development. Second, when they want to make a decision 





faculty members and let them vote for this decision, so this is a collective 
decision. . . Third is the support of the local government. (Interviewee UA) 
 
This university president mentioned that, in the case of Shenyang Jianzhu University: 
Most of the representatives support this decision to move to a new campus. . . 
[and] the local government gave them great support, so they made the decision to 
do so. (Interviewee UA) 
 
Funding. While there was a great need to expand existing universities to meet the 
demand for higher education, funding this expansion was very difficult and created 
serious financial problems. A university leader reported the following:  
There is a university called Jilin University that is maybe one of the top ten in 
China, they got a billion Yuan loan from the bank. They do not think they can pay 
them back, that is the problem. From a financial perspective, I do not think that is 
good for movement of the project. . . [Another institution,] Ligong University, 
could not pay salaries for teachers for several months because they had no money. 
My college just bought a college from Ligong University because they really 
needed this money. (Interviewee UA) 
 
Thus, many peer institutions were not able to financially make a move even if the 
administration agreed that it would be advisable. 
The key issue in the expansion for Shenyang Jianzhu University was the ability to 
solve the funding problems by being able to sell its existing property in the central city 
and to move to a new parcel of land on the outskirts of Shenyang City. The problem, 
however, was that 100% of the land in China was owned by the government. The 
challenge for Professor Zhang was getting the government to create a new policy that 
would allow the university to sell its old campus. This type of arrangement was reported 
to be unprecedented.  
A new policy was created that allowed us to sell the land of the old campus at a 
high price and to buy a much bigger piece of land at a much cheaper price and we 
still had money to construct the project. . . At that time, the government did not 
allow the university to sell their old campus to buy a new campus. Just in time, as 





that allows the selling of the land and buying new land. . . And the university 
makes the collective decision that they will move to the new campus. 
(Interviewee SJU) 
 
It should not go unnoted that interviewees provided little information on how this 
turnaround in policy occurred and how and why it coincided with Professor Zhang’s 
assumption of the leadership position of the university. 
But, while the sale of the land was essential for Shenyang Jianzhu University to 
move to a new campus, it was not enough to fully build it. And, the government "cannot 
offer this money to the University" (Interviewee GO). In fact, the government offered 
only a small amount of money for the construction of the new campus. Shenyang Jianzhu 
University needed a loan from a bank to augment the sale of the land and to build its new 
campus.  
So, there are many difficulties they had to think about before they made the 
decision. . . We only sold one piece of land [of the central city campus] to cash 
out. And to preserve the second piece of land as [collateral] for the business loan 
from the bank, because I know the land will appreciate very fast. I do not want to 
sell it so I got [a loan of] 300 million RMB. So I got enough cash to meet 
immediate needs. (Interviewee B) 
 
This quote speaks to Professor Zhang’s skills in leveraging the new policy for selling of 
land against the stringent requirements for a bank loan.  
While the government could not give the money to Shenyang Jianzhu University, 
they did help them to get the money from the bank. Professor Zhang's ability to raise 
these large amounts of money with new policies and bank loans did raise questions. 
Professor Zhang states 
If you want to build a new campus like us, it needs more money, and the 
government cannot offer this money to the university. . . We organized one half 
billion RMB to build the new campus, and some people think that there may have 
been some corruption because that is a lot of money to build the new campus. But 





was against our decision, the government gave us two benefits through the change 
in policy: one is that they permitted us to sell our old campus in the urban area so 
we can use the money to buy the new campus, and they permitted us to loan 
money from the bank. (Interviewee A) 
 
Professor Zhang’s reference to the suspicions of corruption and his dismissal of 
such suggestions tells us that the timing of Shenyang Jianzhu University’s and Professor 
Zhang’s opportunity did not go without comments from others. Professor Zhang states 
We organized one half billion RMB ($62.5 million) to build the new campus, and 
some people believed that some leaders may be corrupt because of the lot of 
money to build the new campus, but it’s is just in their imagination because in 
China, there are a lot who believe that if there is a big project a lot of leaders will 
be corrupt. So, they just guess the same phenomenon will happen to him. 
(Interviewee A) 
 
Summary. China is experiencing major growth in higher education. As a result of 
this growth, the government is insisting that major universities move to new and larger 
campuses to accommodate the needs for additional students. Professor Zhang realized 
these challenges and met them by working through a government system that had put 
demands on him, but, at the same time offered little help and actually had rules that 
prohibited much of what he needed to accomplish. He was able to convince the 
government to change some of its policies, to effectively allow the university to own the 
land and then permitting the university to sell a portion of the land that belongs to the 
government where the old campus was located and use the portion of land that was not 
sold as collateral to obtain the additional financing needed for the development of the 
new campus through bank loans.  
Dimension: Networking 
Professor Zhang’s ability to raise large amounts of money from many sources 





doubt related to his personal skills, but is also the result of his network of associates that 
he developed over the years as a result of his experiences in the Cultural Revolution, the 
Red Guard, the Communist Youth League, and the Chinese Communist Party. 
Communist Party. During the interviewing of his peers, it was not surprising to 
learn that all of them had a similar background in that they all were members of the 
Communist Party, the Red Guard, and the Chinese Communist Youth League, and knew 
each other, for the most part, while being educated and developing their careers. This is 
an especially important finding since the university governance structure in Chinese 
universities is shared between two structures--the administrative structure of 
president/vice-presidents on the one hand and the Communist Party on the other. 
The Chinese higher education system is a little bit different than the American 
higher education system. We follow the system that most of the important 
decisions are made by Communist Party Committee of different universities and 
then it is the president who carries out those duties. The president has to report his 
duty and his daily work to the Party. (Interviewee A) 
 
Not only was Professor Zhang the head of the Communist Party at the university, 
but he also had long-standing relationships with many important members of the Party 
and the educational establishment in Liaoning Province. Moreover, these individuals 
were all members of the Red Guard and the Communist Youth League as well as leaders 
in the Communist Party, which was common to most future leaders within the Chinese 
university system. 
During my interviews with Zhang, I specifically asked if it was necessary to be a 
member of the Communist Party and to have their support to enable him to accomplish 
his goals. He indicated that membership is essential for the responsible positions within 





This is an important factor, because the Communist Party is now accepted as a 
different Party [but it] is still one Party. Other people, who may not belong to the 
Communist Party, have a chance to be promoted because the Communist Party 
wants to encourage the political participation of many different people. So, being 
a Communist Party member is very important, but it shouldn’t be necessary. But 
to be Party member you are able to achieve your goals maybe faster. (Interviewee 
UA) 
 
The Communist Party is still in charge of the government. 
Professor Zhang and his peers were influenced by the Cultural Revolution. He 
indicated that those who were part of the Revolution felt that, while they sacrificed part 
of their lives for the Revolution, that they learned from their experiences as well. His 
peers are all part of the generation that was forced into the countryside under adverse 
conditions, but they considered that their experiences made them able to withstand 
adversity. These shared experiences also contributed to a network of trust. Professor 
Zhang discusses how these experiences impacted him and his colleagues: 
After I graduated from the junior middle school, I did two and a half years of 
work in the countryside because of the Culture Revolution in China. These two 
and a half years of experience in the countryside was very important for me, 
because this gave me a lot of experience to let me know how to do work in the 
future. (Interviewee B) 
 
One of his peers reports the following: 
One can sum up the influences of the Cultural Revolution [in the following ways]. 
The first influence is that if we really want to make China well-developed, we’d 
better begin our effort from the countryside. Only if the countryside is well-
developed, we can say the whole of China is well-developed. With the experience 
to live in the countryside so many years, it helps me to overcome any difficulty. 
Difficulties now are just small cases if compared to the difficulties I faced in the 
countryside. My generation thinks the Culture Revolution lasted 11 years, which 
is a really long time in our lives. As one who engaged himself in the academic 
field, I found that, compared with other people during the past years, I did 
nothing. So I had to make a lot of effort to catch others to make up what was lost 






Although Professor Zhang and his peers did not comment much about their 
membership in the Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution, the previous quotes as well 
as the following ones are indicative of how their common experiences have contributed 
to their leadership roles and their informal network. Zhang reports 
First, I would like to talk about how I become a leader of my university. As I 
mentioned to you earlier, I was a student as well as a leader of students since I 
was in junior high school. At that time, China was under the Cultural Revolution 
and I was a so-called Red Guard. And, even in senior high school and in 
university, I was also the leader of students so those experiences helped me to 
become a future leader. (Interviewee B) 
 
He further states 
Other leaders of my university have similar background and are also Party 
members and Red Guard members. (Interviewee B) 
 
The Chinese Communist Youth League was another student organization that was 
linked to the Chinese Communist Party. The Youth League is an organization within the 
university system dedicated to selecting students who show potential as future 
government leaders. Zhang, as his peers, was a member of the Youth League. Zhang said 
that “I was a student leader throughout school and belonged to the Red Guard and the 
Youth League. So those experiences helped me to become a future leader.” 




He was an excellent member of the Youth League… [and] he also served as 
Secretary General of the Youth League Committee in schools. (Interviewee SJU) 
 
Summary. Professor Zhang’s ability to get policy changes within the government 
so that he could sell land and then use the proceeds as collateral for a loan to build the 
new campus for Shenyang Jianzhu University was critical to the success of the project. 





for and get permission for the changes needed for his success. The interviews with these 
leaders in Shenyang and Liaoning Province indicate that they all had common 
experiences, trusted each other, and were part of a supportive, informal network of peers. 
It is likely that his network of peers understood the activities that went on among 
government officials and Professor Zhang appeared, at this point in time, more powerful 
in gaining the necessary resources to build the new campus. 
Dimension: Professor Zhang 
The dimension of Professor Zhang is concerned with him as a leader, his personal 
philosophy, and his background. Professor Zhang assumed the leadership of Shenyang 
Jianzhu University in 1998 as Secretary General of the Communist Party at the 
university. Professor Zhang’s leadership role is part of a two-tier system in which 
Chinese universities have a president with limited powers responsible for the 
administration of the university and the Communist Party leader of the university who is 
responsible for the major university policy decisions to guarantee the implementation of 
the Party’s principles, policies, and the state’s educational plans. The Party leader has the 
highest decision-making role in each higher education institution.  
Leadership. Professor Zhang was born June 12, 1956 in Dalian, Liaoning 
Province. His father was an official in the local government and his mother was a worker. 
He has one older sister and two younger brothers. 
My older sister graduated from senior middle school and one of my brothers 
graduated from senior middle school, while the other one graduated from the 
same university as I did--Shenyang Architecture and Engineering University. 
(Interviewee B) 
 
Professor Zhang had a decision to make upon graduation from Shenyang Jianzhu 





be very successful--or an educator. The university, then called Shenyang Architecture 
and Engineering University, decided to  “Keep me as an educator, so I became a teacher 
at the university.”  
Following his graduation, he served in a number of administrative positions in the 
university’s Communist Party as well as in the administration apparatus of the university. 
He describes his progression through the ranks of the university as follows: 
After I graduated, I served as the Secretary of the Youth League and also the 
director of the student affair office, the director of the organization department, 
and the director of the propaganda department and also the director of the 
President’s office, and also I served as the General Secretary of different schools 
in our university. 
By 1993, I was promoted as a vice president of the university. Later, I 
become the Vice Secretary of the Party. The secretary is the number one person in 
controlling the university. It is the government organization. So, the secretary of 
the Party has more power than the president of the university. So, once again I 
have been in charge in students’ activities management, logistics for the entire 
university, and also the research and development of the university, which are 
important sectors in the function of university.  
In 1998, I was promoted to be Secretary of the Party, which is number one 
in command of the university. (Interviewee B) 
 
Being promoted to the powerful position of Secretary of the Party for the 
university at the young age of 42 was very unusual. The person responsible for his 
promotion said: 
When he became the leader of the University, he was quite young. . . there are 
few people who could become the [leader] of a university in China at this age. 
(Interviewee GO) 
 
Professor Zhang viewed the Chinese university as a “small community or 
society”: 
I needed to think about not only the work of teachers and students, but also to 






Common to most, if not all, Chinese universities, this meant that the university 
was responsible for both the professional and personal lives of teachers and students. As 
was indicated above in Professor Zhang’s statement that the university decided to “Keep 
me as an educator, so I became a teacher at the university,” the university had a good deal 
of control over the lives of its employees. 
Following his becoming “the number one in command” of the university, 
Professor Zhang believed his key role as the Party leader of the university was to ensure 
the successful transition of the university from the old campus to the construction of the 
new campus. While he himself was able to identify his role in this way, he did not find 
that all of the members of the university accepted his ideas. 
Professor Zhang tried his best to persuade the others to accept his new thinking 
and help make it become a reality. And, you can see that almost all of the faculty 
members are proud to be successful. But, at that time, Professor Zhang really met 
with a lot of difficulties to achieve his goals. (Interviewee GO) 
 
There are two interviewees that are of particular importance because of their 
positions with the government. Both have worked extensively with Zhang and are 
members of the Party that he has worked with to make the changes required for his 
success. They made the following statements: 
If I make a comparison between Jianzhu University and the other universities in 
Liaoning Province, I would like to say it is just like difference between Professor 
Zhang, who is the Secretary General of Communist Party at Jianzhu University, 
and other university leaders. I found that Professor Zhang is quite dedicated in 
everything he did. Whatever things he wants to do he can make it successful. 
(Interviewee UL) 
 
Among all of those directors who are in charge of the same affairs in the 
universities, Professor Zhang is the person who has the distinguishing character. 






Governance of university. As previously written, in Chinese universities, most of 
the important policy decisions were made by the Communist Party Committee and then it 
was the president who carried out the decisions in this dual system. It was clear that the 
Secretary General of the Communist Party for the university had the real power. 
An important part of the results of this study has to do with the governance of 
Shenyang Jianzhu University and how Zhang’s success is based on his ability to use his 
networks and understand the use of teamwork to get what he needs to accomplish his 
goals within this two-tiered system.  
Also, I think that he is easy going because he works with others together and he 
has the spirit of teamwork. He can work with other people harmoniously. 
(Interviewee UA) 
 
Zhang’s promotion to Secretary General of the Party for the university was very 
timely in that he was given the opportunity to become Secretary when the transition from 
an old campus to a new campus was being contemplated. One may question if Zhang’s 
transition was timely or planned given the success of Zhang’s network. 
Zhang’s rapid promotions and the timing of those promotions is important to 
illustrate how Zhang used his leadership skills, networking, and political abilities to 
achieve the changes needed to accomplish the task of moving Shenyang Jianzhu 
University from the old campus to the new campus and significantly increasing the size 
and scope of the University. 
Before Zhang was promoted to Secretary General, Shenyang Architectural and 
Engineering University, as it was named then, was under the administration of Professor 
Chen who was President of the university. Professor Chen had been a vice president of 





Professor Chen was President of the university two years before Zhang was promoted to 
Secretary General of the Party for the university. An interesting question is why did 
Professor Chen choose not to remain as President and be part of the move from the old 
campus to the new campus? Professor Chen said 
When I was promoted to President, I just told my boss that I would like to retire 
from this position, but the Ministry did not accept this. I worked [as President] 
until 2001; they finally agreed that I could retire from my position. (Interviewee 
SJU) 
 
Since I was born in 1948, I retired from the position of President at the time I was 
53 years old. According to Chinese regulations, to be president, I can only work 
until I am 60 years old. At that time, if I still wanted to be president I could work 
seven years more before I retired, but I loved my subject very much; I loved 
architecture very much. If I still served as president of the university, that would 
occupy a lot of my time that I could use to do my research. I wanted time to do 
my own research before my retirement. That is real reason why I retired from 
president. (Interviewee SJU) 
 
It is hard work to be a Chinese university president. (Interviewee SJU) 
 
Professor Chen, besides retiring before the move from the old campus to the new 
campus also had reservations about the wisdom of the move. One of Professor Chen’s 
peers said: 
Professor Chen asked to retire from the president’s position because to build a 
new campus, a bank loan was needed [but] it may be a risk for the university 
because if we cannot move successfully then we cannot have our salary because 
we owe the bank so much in loans. (Interviewee UA) 
 
He faced the problems for finance, also the Ministry of Construction because at 
that time, the Ministry had just taken over the affairs of [local] institutions. 
(Interviewee UA) 
 
Professor Chen indicated, during his interview, that he was especially concerned 
about the faculty in the context of their having jobs and the ability to pay them if this 





As a result of Professor Chen’s retirement in 2001, Professor Zhang was in the 
position to use his network of people and team building to orchestrate the move from the 
old campus to the new campus. In effect, Professor Zhang was both Secretary General of 
the Communist Party of the University as well as President, albeit informally. But 
Professor Zhang faced many difficulties. 
First, the Ministry of Construction must approve the development of a university 
belonging to the provincial government. Then, the government must evaluate a 
general plan. Also, there must be an approval from the Shenyang Government. 
Then, you must send an application to the local government and get approval. 
(Interviewee UA) 
 
The application and planning processes were just a few of the development issues 
that Zhang faced. He also faced other issues in the opinions of government officials. 
People who report to the government feel nervous and do not want to let Professor 
Zhang go [forward]. They just feel nervous with such a plan because, if such a 
plan failed, they [did not want to be responsible]. (Interviewee UA) 
 
Describing Zhang’s leadership ability, a member of the Liaoning Provincial 
Communist Party apparatus stated: 
Among all of those in charge of the affairs in the universities, Professor Zhang is 
the person who has the distinguishing character. . . [and] he also uses efforts to 
build up the faculty teams and to [solicit] innovative ideas. (Interviewee UA) 
Professor Zhang always thinks about how to persuade the others to accept his 
concept. (Interviewee UA) 
 
Finally, I asked Professor Zhang about his future beyond being Secretary General 
of the University. Zhang replied 
To be honest, until now, I did not get an official invitation to be promoted from 
the government, but I think the responsibility [now] is to make the university 
better. (Interviewee C) 
 
Summary. The main part of this study is the leadership role of Professor Fuchang 





university and in the building of a new campus. As reported by his peers in higher 
education in Liaoning Province, Professor Zhang has achieved what few other university 
leaders within the Chinese higher education system have been able to do. He has met the 
goal of the Chinese Communist Party to expand their university system even against the 
obstacles that the Party itself had in place and to do so without creating financial 
difficulties for the university.  
Archival Data 
Beyond the interviews of the 12 higher education leaders in Liaoning Province, I 
was able to secure four years of data from the Communist Party questionnaires that are 
used to assess the performance of institutional leaders. While the data is limited by the 
Party’s refusal to release the questions used in the questionnaire, Professor Zhang 
provided permission for the results to be used in this study. The questionnaires are given 
to the faculty and administrators of Shenyang Jianzhu University annually. The surveys 
are sets of questionnaires from 2002 through 2005 of Professor Zhang’s performance as a 
leader. The questionnaires were administered by the Chinese Communist Party to survey 
its leaders’ capabilities.     
The trends from the data indicate that, between the years 2002 through 2005, 
Professor Zhang’s performance as a leader improved. In 2002, his score in the 
“excellent” category was 114, or 66.3%. In 2003, his score in the “excellent” category 
was 137, or 71.7%. In 2004, his score in the “excellent” category was 140, or 77.8%. 
Finally, in 2005, his score in the “excellent” category was 143, or 77.3%.     
Generally, his peers viewed Zhang as an increasingly strong leader each year over 





Shenyang Jianzhu University from the old campus to the new campus. Unfortunately, I 
do not have data prior to the time Professor Zhang made his move to a new campus to 
compare what his leadership scores were. In fact, that data may not exist since the 
archival surveys are questionnaires about university leaders. But, it would be an 





Year   Total   Excellent  Qualified  Unqualified  Blank 
 
2002   172   114   46    10     2 
 
2003   191   137   42    7     5 
 
2004   180   140   34    6     0 
 










Chapter V: Discussion 
Introduction 
This chapter represents a discussion of findings from the case study as they relate 
to Shenyang Jianzhu University successfully making a move from an old campus 
environment to a new campus and Professor Zhang’s role as the leader during this 
transition. The findings were derived from 12 interviews. Empirical data from the 
interviews led to the development of three major dimensions, which are university 
construction, networking, and Professor Zhang. In addition, there are four years of 
surveys using Communist Party questionnaires that are used to assess the performance of 
institutional leaders. 
In chapter 2 of this dissertation, I described a brief history of Chinese higher 
education to help the reader understand the context in which Shenyang Jianzhu 
University developed and, briefly, the nature of the governance structure of Chinese 
universities--which is a dual-structure based on the Communist Party interests and the 
operations of the university. The study also dealt with the history of Shenyang Jianzhu 
University and the major events in the development of the new campus, which is the 
primary focus of this research, along with the relationship between Professor Fuchang 
Zhang and Shenyang Jianzhu University, and how he led the physical development of the 
university. 
The following is a discussion of the major findings of this study:  
1. the governmental policy changes that supported the building of Shenyang 





2. Professor Zhang’s role as a leader in capitalizing on the opportunities to 
rebuild Shenyang Jianzhu University 
3. the role of Professor Zhang’s connection to leaders in the Liaoning 
government and Communist Party in his success at Shenyang Jianzhu 
University. 
Shenyang Jianzhu University.  First, it is important to provide a context for this 
study by examining Shenyang Jianzhu University within the higher education movement 
in China from Mao through the end of the Cultural Revolution. Following the end of the 
Cultural Revolution and the ascension of Deng Xiaoping as the Chinese leader, there was 
a major shift in the economic philosophy of China. The entrepreneurial spirit of the 
Chinese was encouraged, free enterprise zones were created, and, along with the 
investment of Western companies in cheap labor, China became a major economic 
power.  
This quasi-free market economy, privately-owned companies combined with 
state-owned companies, fueled the economy and significantly increased the aspirations of 
the Chinese people. A key aspect of these new aspirations included a sharply increased 
emphasis on university education which, along with the suppression of university 
attendance in the Cultural Revolution, led to great increases in students seeking higher 
education.  
Guorui (2006) writes  
. . .the market economy has increasingly become a fact that cannot be ignored in 
China’s economic life. People have opened their minds to these facts and, for the 
first time since the founding of the People’s Republic, have listed education and 






This, in turn, necessitated massive increases in the physical capacity of 
universities to serve these students. Along with major structural changes occurring 
through the consolidation of many institutions and the decentralizing of many universities 
from the central government to provincial governments, the increase in the number of 
students was very impressive. Wei (2005) writes that “Nationwide in 2002, there were 
9,034,000 students at ordinary higher education institutions, a 7.8 fold increase over 1982 
(1,158,205) and a 4.1 fold increase over 1992 (2,203,415)” (p. 11). These enrollment 
numbers are further confirmed by Pan (2007) who wrote “Regular institutions of higher 
learning grew in terms of number of students from 2.29 million in 1992 to 3.35 million in 
1997, a 47 percent increase in five years” (p. 77). 
The key to this enormous change in enrollments at Chinese universities was the 
government policy of 1999, which created a nine-year plan to increase access to Chinese 
higher education. Shenyang Jianzhu University, like much of the rest of Chinese higher 
education, participated in these massive changes. In many ways, Shenyang Jianzhu 
University was a leader and model for how a university could build a large physical 
capacity in a very short period of time through the creative and, at times, ingenious 
leadership of Professor Zhang. While many universities began to make significant 
changes in their physical capacity in the 1990s and early first decade of the 21st century, 
a good number had trouble getting the necessary financial resources to build their 
campuses and that created serious problems for them.  
Changes in Chinese universities. As described in chapter 4, a university leader in 
Liaoning Province reported that: 
. . .some universities that built new campuses‚ borrowed a lot of money from the 





Ligong University could not pay salaries for teachers for several months because 
they had no money. My college just bought a college from Ligong University 
because they really needed this money; they have no money to pay everything. 
(Interviewee UA) 
 
There is a university called Jilin University that is maybe one of the top ten in 
China, they got a billion Yuan from the bank. They do not think they can pay 
them back, that is the problem. (Interviewee UA) 
 
To be honest, there are many universities who failed in new campus construction. 
Actually many factors influenced the decision-making. There are three factors: 
first is the trend in the country--at that time the government supported the 
development of polytechnic colleges, which offered those institutions the 
opportunity for future development. Second, when they wanted to make a 
decision to go to a new campus, the institutions selected many representatives 
from the faculty members and let them vote for this decision, so this is a 
collective decision. . . Third, is the support of the local government. (Interviewee 
UA)  
 
The physical growth of Shenyang Jianzhu University required a combination of a 
change in Chinese government policy toward the ownership of the land on which the 
university was located and the creative use of the land in order to amass the necessary 
financial resources to build a new campus. The building of Shenyang Jianzhu University 
also required the collective decision of the employees at the University and the trust they 
had to have in Professor Zhang. 
Professor Zhang. As discussed in chapter 4, Professor Zhang assumed the 
leadership of Shenyang Jianzhu University in 1998 as Secretary General of the 
Communist Party at the university. Professor Zhang’s leadership role was part of a two-
tier system in which Chinese universities have a president and the Communist Party 
leader of the university who is responsible for the major university policy decisions. The 
Party leader has the highest decision-making role in each higher education institution. 
The key issues in trying to understand why Professor Zhang was so successful in 





energize his network of colleagues in Liaoning Province. In chapter 2, I discussed how 
Professor Zhang’s networking was based on his elite status in the Communist Party. 
Professor Zhang’s leadership success, in many ways, is the result of the paradoxical style 
common to many successful leaders. On the one hand, he is a strong, tough leader who is 
capable of taking full control of the university leadership--both the Chinese Communist 
Party (his formal role) and, informally, the administrative apparatus; on the other hand, 
he is a team player, is persuasive, and is a dynamic entrepreneurial leader who seems to 
create a great deal of trust in his Party and Liaoning Province peers. Combining these two 
sides together, this paradoxical leadership seems to have led to his success in the difficult 
political environment he faced. His success seems to have been the result of the support 
of his powerful network of peers, who went through the difficulties they had in the Red 
Guard and Cultural Revolution and their sacrifices together. While there is no direct 
evidence of this last comment on the trust that Zhang’s network developed in each other 
and how it was directly related to Zhang’s success, I feel that there is enough information 
presented in the interviews to reach this interpretation.  
However, not all interviews were cordial. One interviewee who was a university 
administrator was exceptionally nervous. His physical appearance was that of perspiring 
heavily and very nervous. He avoided directly answering as many questions as possible. 
He did not want to be interviewed as evidenced by his indicating that he accepted the 
request only because it was from Professor Zhang. A second interviewee was hostile. He 
questioned my asking questions that specifically pertained to the Communist Party and 
expounded the Party’s ideology. However, both interviewees did cooperate and added 





Alluto and Hrebiniak (as cited in Bass, 1990) learned that  
. . .some people enjoy taking risks, but others do not. Such preferences and 
behavior affect leadership that emerges. Older leaders were found generally more 
conservative and more likely to avoid taking risks. They want more information 
and higher probabilities of success and may be content with lower payoffs as a 
consequence. (p. 149)  
 
This contrast between the younger Professor Zhang and the older Professor Chen seems 
to reflect these differences in risk taking behavior.  
Another important issue in Professor Zhang’s success is that, in 1999, the Chinese 
government made a significant policy change to rapidly expand the capacity of 
universities to enroll students. This major policy shift coincided with Zhang’s assumption 
of his role as the Secretary General of the Communist Party at Shenyang Jianzhu 
University and, a short time later, the resignation of Chen as President. Zhang was seen 
by his peers as a rising star in the leadership of universities--he was very young to assume 
his post--and the sense one gets from the interviews with Zhang, as well as his peers and 
his direct superior, is that Zhang is a strong, forceful, and charismatic leader. While 
Chinese cultural etiquette may well have not permitted Zhang to state how he was able to 
jump at the opportunity to initiate change at the University (as well as possibly 
encouraging Chen to resign), it may well be that Zhang’s entrepreneurial, collaborative, 
and charismatic leadership style matched the evolving events in Chinese higher 
education, and, thereby, enabled him to be at the right place at the right time--whether 
this was coincidence or planned by his powerful peers is not clear. What is clear is that 
Zhang grabbed the moment and made the most of it.  It is also important to note that 
while Zhang did not tell me all he did--and I am sure there were a great many tough 





that he was a great success. Not only was he willing to share his high marks from his 
university colleagues over the period of 2002 through 2005, but he also said that he 
would give himself a 95% success score. 
Post Mao Chinese context. The nature of Zhang’s leadership occurred within the 
changing Chinese environment and, what I would at least call, the conflicting economic 
and political environment of present day China. On the other hand, the Chinese 
government emphasizes and strongly encourages the economically entrepreneurial 
behavior of its citizens and government departments within a relatively open-market 
economic perspective. In effect, the Chinese government is fostering freedom of 
economic expression and seeking to become a global economic power while still 
maintaining a political system that restricts political expression. 
There is a serious question about whether China will be able to continue this 
separation of economic and political expression. The story of Shenyang Jianzhu 
University and the numerous other Chinese universities that are building major increases 
in their enrollment capacity and in attendance leads one to wonder whether the Chinese 
government and Party apparatus will be able to continue its political suppression. The 
government is facing a largely novel context of vast numbers of newly educated citizens 
who have an opportunity to work in businesses that are independent of the direct control 
of the Party and the government.  
Tiananmen Square represented a refusal of the Party and government in 1989 to 
accept a more open political environment. Another reason for the uprising at Tiananmen 
Square is expressed by Zhao (1996), indicating that the difficulties of students going 





Since 1978, a large number of Chinese university students have gone to Western 
countries, especially to North America. This . . .widespread phenomenon of going 
abroad provided an important alternative for aggrieved university students, and 
the increased difficulty for Chinese university students to go abroad in the late 
eighties was one of the major grievances of Chinese students on the eve of the 
1989 Chinese Student Movement. (p. 145) 
 
It is possible for one to also presume that the combination of the lack of capacity 
of university education at home combined with the restriction on studying abroad 
continued to be a problem for the Chinese government. In the 1990s, as the economy of 
China started to develop in a powerful way, one can imagine that this lack of capacity in 
Chinese higher education was a major problem for people seeking university level 
education (especially given the suppression of university education during the Cultural 
Revolution) as well as an economy that needed such education for its continued growth. 
The change in government policy in 1999 reflects these needs and pressures. 
The article referred to above (Zhao, 1996) was written three years before the new 
Chinese government higher education growth policy and two years before Zhang became 
the leader of Shenyang Jianzhu University. In 1997, there were 3.4 million students 
attending Chinese universities; by 2002, there were over 9 million students attending 
universities (Zhao, 1996). While this huge increase in enrollments seems, from my 
perspective, to be a desirable change, like all such major societal and institutional 
changes, there may well be unintended (by the Chinese Communist Party and 
government) major shifts in the social and cultural environment--especially if it 
continues.  
It may well be that the next challenge for Zhang and his colleagues is to deal with 
the outcomes--intended and unintended--of their successful building of the enrollment 





deal with their increased economic status?  Will they continue to support the expression 
of their economic interests while accepting the repression of their political expression as 
presently exists?  Will the Chinese Communist Party continue to evolve, as was indicated 
in the responses of a number of interviewees, by admitting non-Party members into 
important leadership positions?  Will Chinese leaders like Zhang--who is still quite young 
by Chinese leadership standards--be able to make a major shift in the political 
environment of the country as Deng did in the economic arena?  Will the sophistication, 
entrepreneurialism, and courage--as well as charisma and strength-- that led Zhang to be 
so successful at Shenyang Jianzhu University enable him to take on a larger role in the 
Chinese government and begin developing the complex and difficult answers to these 
struggles in China as it emerges as a major international player in this global economic 
world?  
Limitations of the Study 
There are many limitations of the study that are related to my personal friendship 
with Professor Zhang, to my professional relationship with Professor Zhang and 
Shenyang Jianzhu University, as well as to the methodology. 
Interview data limitations include the possibility that the observer may affect the 
situation being observed in unknown ways. Interview limitations include possibly 
distorted responses due to personal bias (Patton, 2002). There are personal friendships 
and professional relationships involved in this study among the interviewees, which may 
have easily provided a one-sidedness to the data and which may affect bias. 
An important limitation is the relationship between Urbana University and 





China for my university’s MBA program. I was working with Li Ji Ning, the Director of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) for Eastern China, to recruit young adults within 
government, business, and industry in the city of Shenyang, Liaoning Province. The local 
government also wanted us to establish professional relationships with the local 
universities to extend our recruiting efforts to students as well. Mrs. Luo Shaomei, 
Director of the Educational Department of Liaoning Province, arranged a meeting with 
Zhao Chang Yi, Mayor of Shenyang City who sanctioned our work with the WTO. He 
expressed his desire for us to expand our recruitment to local universities. Mrs. Luo 
decided that Shenyang Jianzhu University, because it represented a progressive example 
of a Chinese university, would be the first group to meet. Those introductions led to a 
personal friendship with Professor Zhang and a professional relationship with Shenyang 
Jianzhu University.  
Although these personal and professional relationships exist and the reader must 
take them into account, they do not, I believe, preclude the significance of this research. 
My work with Professor Zhang gave me insight into what I consider his extraordinary 
leadership skills and accomplishments within the restrictive environment of the 
Communist Party system of governance.  
Although my access was closed, as a Westerner, to the Communist Party and was 
dependent on Professor Zhang, I earned Professor Zhang’s trust. His trust led to 
discussions about my research of Shenyang Jianzhu University’s move from its old 
campus to its new campus, which had just occurred and was much of the discussion 
within the local government at the time. Also, Professor Zhang’s leadership of the move 





would agree to let me research and write a case study about Shenyang Jianzhu University 
and his leadership of the university. He agreed, but only after he informed me that he had 
been asked to be interviewed by the Chinese and foreign press, but had declined. He 
believed that this research would be important for Shenyang Jianzhu University and the 
Chinese higher education system. As part of the study, it was also Professor Zhang who, 
at my request, arranged my interviews. While this study is based on a significant 
opportunity, which also could have led to bias in who was interviewed and what I was 
told, I thought it was important to undertake because of the unique access I was given. It 
is up to the reader to assess whether the results and my interpretation of them provide a 
deeper understanding of some aspects of Chinese higher education.  
The methodology of the study also provided significant limitations. I do not read, 
write, or speak Mandarin. Because this study is about a Chinese educational leader and an 
institution in China, cross-cultural interviewing is an issue. Patton (2002) writes  
Cross-cultural inquires add layers of complexity to the already complex 
interactions of an interview. The possibility for misunderstandings is  
significant. . . miscommunications [are] harder to detect because of false 
assumptions about shared meanings. The situation becomes more precarious when 
a translator or interpreter must be used. . . [as] translators need to understand 
what, precisely, you want them to ask and that you will need full and complete 
translation of responses as verbatim as possible. (pp. 391-392)  
 
All interviews were electronically recorded, transcribed, and translated. While a 
Shenyang Jianzhu University translator, from their International Department, was 
assigned to accompany me and translate my interviews, I do have the original notes taken 
in Mandarin, as well as my notes that were further translated by a different person. All 
electronically recorded interviews were also translated by a different person. 





Finally, all data analysis of the interviews and attributing meaning to the research 
and the results are filtered through my lens as a Westerner of male Caucasian heritage. 
However, I have had previous experience within the Asian culture with the Vietnam War 
and previously conducting business in Hong Kong and Macao, which does contribute 
somewhat to my understanding. 
I submit my dissertation and understanding of the building of the Shenyang 
Jianzhu University and Professor Zhang’s leadership with great humility and awareness 
that it tells only one small part of the university’s and of Professor Zhang’s journey.  
Significance of the Study 
Given the limitations of this study, I still chose to do the study because the access 
that I had gave me an unprecedented, unique look at how some significant changes have 
occurred in China’s higher educational system. Further, with my access, I was able to 
explore how a successful university leader can operate in the Chinese political system, 
which seems opposed to such significant institutional change.  
Conclusions 
The move of Shenyang Jianzhu University from its old campus to its new campus 
encountered controversy from government officials who had to approve such a move. 
They believed that procuring loans based on the sale of land and encountering debt was 
not necessary. The evidence from this study suggests that selling the land and avoiding 
unsecured debt was important. The success of Shenyang Jianzhu University is that it did 
move to a new campus and the success of the move is the result of Professor Zhang’s 





Focusing on Professor Zhang and his powerful role in building the new campus of 
Shenyang Jianzhu University becomes understandable in the context of the 
administration of Professor Chen, who was President of the university from 1996 to 
2001. President Chen was reluctant to make the move from an old campus to a new 
campus for the university. Because he had reservations about the wisdom of such a move, 
Chen had asked the Ministry of Education for permission to retire; he wanted to pursue 
his goals of developing the Architectural department of the University. His retirement 
was denied until 2001, when the Ministry approved.  
As a result of Professor Chen’s retirement in 2001, Professor Zhang was in the 
position to use his network of people and team building to orchestrate the move from the 
old campus to the new campus. In effect, Professor Zhang was both Secretary General of 
the Communist Party of the University as well as President, albeit informally. This was 
the opportunity that allowed the move of Shenyang Jianzhu University from an old 
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